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Health,Public Health | 1 Comment

Last Christmas, I spent a somewhat panicky intersemester break writing an amicus brief [1] for King v.
Burwell [2] . I was worried that five Supreme Court justices were going to be too tempted by the
plaintiffs’ legalistic interpretation of Obamacare’s text, despite ample evidence [3] beyond the text that
Congress never intended [4] to deprive citizens in 34 states of health insurance subsidies.
In a seminar I taught at Boston University, one of my students had proposed a legalistic version [5] of
the common sense point that Congress could not possibly have intended the plaintiffs’ result—a
legalistic argument that could be fatal to the plaintiffs’ case but that the government could not make—
and I decided to spend my break writing and submitting it.

The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance
Together with my student and the Jewish Alliance for Law and Social Action (JALSA), I wrote a brief
arguing that the plaintiffs’ interpretation of § 36B, which would have treated health insurance subsidies
as an incentive for states to establish exchanges, would raise serious constitutional problems. The
plaintiffs’ interpretation, we argued, plausibly violated both the anticoercion constraint that the Court
had announced in NFIB v. Sebelius [6] (the first Obamacare case) and the fundamental principle of
equal sovereignty that the Court had announced in Shelby County v. Holder [7] (the Voting Rights Act
case).
The constitutional problem we highlighted was that, if the plaintiffs’ understanding prevailed, the federal
government would end up enforcing a senselessly destructive regulatory regime in nonestablishing
states, while enforcing a sensible regime in compliant states, and it would do so with the intent of
forcing all states to manage their own exchanges.
Under Shelby County, the federal government is constitutionally obligated to treat all states the same,
and under NFIB, the federal government is constitutionally prohibited from threatening states with
destruction if they refuse to implement federal programs. We weren’t arguing that § 36B was actually
unconstitutional.
We were raising a rule of statutory construction, called the canon of constitutional avoidance that urges
judges to avoid any statutory interpretation that would raise constitutional questions. Even the
potential constitutional defects we highlighted would have justified the Court in choosing the
government’s interpretation over the plaintiffs’.
At the King oral arguments [8] , Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Kennedy all drew from the JALSA
brief in questioning the plaintiffs’ lawyer. Indeed, Justice Kennedy made explicit reference to one of the
hypothetical questions we posed in the brief; Kennedy noted that the federal government would not be
allowed to lower the speed limit to 35 MPH in states that refused to raise their drinking age—a callback
to the Supreme Court’s first anticoercion case, South Dakota v. Dole [9] , that we had included to
highlight the potential problems with regulatory coercion.
In light of the justices’ questions, I was confident that Kennedy would vote for the government, but I
was also completely sure that he would write an opinion, whether a majority or concurrence, that
rested on our mutual constitutional concerns with the plaintiffs’ interpretation.
I was right on the first count, but deeply wrong on the second. Not only did Kennedy join Chief Justice
Roberts’s majority opinion without writing separately, but also Roberts’s opinion completely ignored the
constitutional problems that his colleagues and I had highlighted.
For me, this result was a little bit ego blow, a little bit regret for the lost Christmas break, and a large bit
relief. The justices declined an opportunity I had given them to strengthen a couple of constitutional
doctrines that are wildly unpopular among progressive academics (i.e., my friends and colleagues). But
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/07/02/theargumentthatwasnt/print/
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the result is also deeply puzzling—not just [10] for me [11] —and I’d like to take a moment to explain
why.

Destruction v. Coercion
The statutory provision at issue in King, § 36B, contained three words—“by the State”—that Roberts
admitted he was rendering superfluous. Typically, courts try to give effect to all words in a statute if
possible, so Roberts needed to give some justification for his embrace of an interpretation that mooted
three of § 36B’s words.
The reason I spent my Christmas break on the brief was to supply the Court with such a justification. If
giving effect to those three words would render the statute plausibly unconstitutional, then the Court
might end up with a choice between mooting the words or invalidating the statute. When given that
choice, courts basically always choose to moot the words, either through avoidance in a statutory case
or through severance in a constitutional case.
And Roberts is generally a fan of “savings constructions”—interpretations of statutory provisions that
avoid constitutional problems. Indeed, he used such a construction in NFIB, deeming the individual
mandate a tax rather than a penalty in order to save it from unconstitutionality.
But Roberts didn’t use that justification in King. Instead, he made a much simpler argument. The
Congress that enacted Obamacare intended to fix health insurance markets, Roberts said, not to
destroy them. The plaintiffs’ interpretation would threaten to destroy the markets, so that
interpretation can’t possibly be what Congress intended. Roberts’s simple argument is essentially the
same one we made in the JALSA brief—a concern over potential destruction of states’ insurance
markets—but without all the constitutional jiggerypokery [11] .
Here’s the puzzle. Justice Scalia, in dissent, articulated the plaintiffs’ rebuttal to that argument, and
Scalia’s rebuttal clearly raised the constitutional specter we had identified in the JALSA brief. Scalia said
that the plaintiffs’ interpretation might cause destruction in health insurance markets, but if it did, then
the states could simply establish exchanges in order to avoid the destruction. And if the plaintiffs’
interpretation turned out to be as destructive as Roberts predicted, Scalia argued, then all states would
surely establish exchanges.
In other words, Scalia’s argument was: If the coercive threat turns out to be coercive, then all states
will be coerced, but no states will be destroyed. Given that Roberts had articulated a concern about
destruction but no concern about coercion, Scalia could assert coercion as a safeguard against
destruction. Coercion became an uncomplicated rebuttal to Roberts’s only articulated justification for
mooting three words of the statute.
This rebuttal might seem strangely casual for the justice who took coercion so seriously in the NFIB oral
arguments [12] and dissent, but for Scalia, it actually makes sense. Scalia doesn’t believe in the canon
of constitutional avoidance, and he would rather invalidate an entire statute—allowing Congress to try
again—than moot three of its words—transforming Obamacare into SCOTUScare. To Scalia, whether
mooting words occurs through severance or avoidance matters not at all; he believes the Court’s
obligation is to enforce whole statutes or to invalidate whole statutes.
Still, though, why didn’t Roberts respond? As Scalia pointed out, the plaintiffs’ understanding of
congressional intent would have avoided both the mooting of statutory language and the destruction of
health insurance markets. The only problem with the plaintiffs’ interpretation, from a purely legalistic
perspective, was the plausibly unconstitutional coercion it would cause. Why didn’t Roberts make some
mention of that flaw?
Roberts openly admitted that he was rendering three words of a statute superfluous; he gave a
justification for ignoring those words that the plaintiffs, through Scalia, effectively rebutted; and he
gave no rebuttal to the rebuttal, despite the availability of a fullyformed counterargument in an
amicus brief that his colleagues had discussed at oral arguments. Not only that, but I think Roberts
must have convinced Kennedy not to write a concurrence highlighting the constitutional issue. Roberts
seems to have gone pretty far out of his way to avoid avoidance [13] .
I’m not terribly good at reading justices’ minds, so I won’t pretend to know why Roberts wanted to
avoid the constitutional argument. Given the overall tenor of his opinion, though, and given what I
know about the public debates leading up to King, I have one guess. I think Roberts—like most
Americans who were familiar with Obamacare—thought it painfully obvious that Congress intended
subsidies to be available nationwide.
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/07/02/theargumentthatwasnt/print/
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There was a mountain of evidence that the three words in § 36B were there by mistake, and there was
no evidence, beyond the text, that Congress wanted to use subsidies as an incentive for exchange
creation.
Unfortunately, because the statute was hastily and inartfully drafted and because the Solicitor General’s
office could not make convincing sense of the words “by the State” in the relevant provision, Roberts
could not prove the obvious conclusion through the usual tools of statutory construction. Because
Roberts lives in the age of textualism, he was unwilling to reach beyond the text of the statute for proof
of congressional intent, and the plaintiffs and their allies had come up with answers [14] to all of the
purely textual and structural arguments [15] that the government and its allies had made.
Roberts seems to have run head on into an ageold conflict [16] between legalism and realism. The
legalistic case for the government’s interpretation was a close call, but to anyone who was willing to
look beyond the text of the statute, the reality of the government’s rightness was a slam dunk. The
justices don’t live in a legalistic vacuum, but for reasons that are not entirely clear, some of them like to
pretend they do. Roberts is sometimes among them. But in King, Roberts seems to have been unwilling
to walk the legalistic garden path, which would have ended in constitutional avoidance.
Roberts did not write a broadly purposivist opinion. He cited none of the mountain of extrinsic evidence
of congressional intent that supported the government’s interpretation. He carefully referred to the
legislative “plan” everywhere that a latterday purposivist would have referred to the legislative
“purpose.”
He sidelined Chevron deference rather than blessing his purposive approach as a legitimate argument
for Chevron Step One. But he refused to close the loop on the legalistic case for the government’s
construction. He refused to walk his legalism all the way to avoidance.

Avoiding Avoidance
In his decision to avoid avoidance, there may have been a lot of thoughts more prominent in Roberts’s
consciousness than a resistance to legalism. He might have thought that a constitutional argument
would invite further litigation that he had no interest in inviting. He might have thought that repetition
of his NFIB argument—this time to “save” rather than weaken the statute—would look confusing or
strange to a public that has been unusually attentive to the Obamacare cases.
He might have wanted to avoid a public misperception that he had deemed the statute unconstitutional
but upheld it anyway. He might have wanted to avoid quasiconstitutional discourse—which is what
constitutional avoidance holdings create—on two seriously underdeveloped constitutional doctrines.
But I suspect and hope that some little voice in Roberts’s head was objecting to the willfully irrational
and unrealistic legalism of the plaintiffs’ case. I suspect and hope that some part of Roberts’s thinking
was a rebellion to the textualists’ willful blinders to an empirically obvious congressional intent.
Ultimately, I think we should understand Roberts’s avoidance of avoidance as a quiet but profound
statement against the creeping unreality of textualist interpretation.
Roberts shouldn’t have needed avoidance to win the case, so he simply refused to need it. It’s a
puzzling little opinion. But I have never been so pleased to be rendered superfluous.
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KING, CHEVRON, AND THE AGE OF TEXTUALISM
ABIGAIL R. MONCRIEFF

In the King v. Burwell oral arguments, Chief Justice John Roberts—usually
one of the more active members of the Court—asked only one substantive
question, addressed to the Solicitor General: “If you’re right about Chevron
[deference applying to this case], that would indicate that a subsequent
administration could change [your] interpretation?” As it turns out, that
question was crucial to Roberts’s thinking and to the 6-3 opinion he authored,
but almost all commentators either undervalued or misunderstood the
question’s import (myself included). The result of Roberts’s actual thinking
was an unfortunate outcome for Chevron—and potentially for the rule of
law—despite the happy outcome for the Obama Administration.
KING BACKGROUND
The central question in King was whether Obamacare allows the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) to distribute health insurance subsidies nationwide or
whether, instead, the statute limits subsidies to states that establish their own
health insurance exchanges. In a 2012 rulemaking, the IRS interpreted the
statute to permit subsidies in all states, regardless of the states’ exchange
establishment choices. The plaintiffs argued that the IRS Rule was contrary to
statute, pointing to language in an arcane provision, 26 U.S.C. § 36B, to argue
that Obamacare intended to limit subsidies to establishing states. The relevant
provision sets the formula for calculating subsidy amounts, and it calibrates
subsidies to the cost of insurance purchased on “an Exchange established by
the State,” without making reference to the fallback Exchange that the federal
government set up for non-establishing states. Based on that language, the
plaintiffs argued that Congress intended to use subsidies as an incentive for
states to take on the thankless task of creating and managing the exchanges.
In defending the IRS Rule against the plaintiffs’ interpretation, the
government’s primary rebuttal was that the overall statutory structure would
fall apart if subsidies were disallowed. Obamacare rests on three interlocking
pieces: market reforms, mandates, and subsidies. But the mandates are
unenforceable without the subsidies, and the market reforms don’t work
without the mandates. The statute was designed such that all three pieces
needed to be in place for the regulatory regime to work. Removing any one of
them would cause the whole thing to collapse. Furthermore, collapse of the
regulatory regime through withdrawal of subsidies would not leave states in
the same position they were in before Obamacare passed. Given the statute’s
structure, withdrawing the subsidies would nullify the mandates while leaving
1

2
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the market reforms in full force and effect. But in the absence of subsidies and
mandates, the market reforms would cause untold harm in individual insurance
markets—the “death spirals” that everyone, including the Court, referenced
throughout the arguments and in the opinions.
The Solicitor General made this case before the Court, arguing that
Congress could not possibly have intended its statute to be purposefully
destructive in states that refused to establish exchanges. The government also
made a careful (but not particularly persuasive, to my mind) textual case that
the federal exchange ought to qualify as an “Exchange established by the
State” because “established by the State” was a term of art for “established in
the state.” But the government never explained why Congress would use “by”
as a term of art for “in”—or how the inclusion of that “term of art” added
anything meaningful to the statute that would have been lacking if the
provision had simply said “an Exchange established under this Act.”
CHEVRON BACKGROUND
In an ordinary case involving an administrative agency’s interpretation of a
statute, the court would assess the agency’s construction under the Chevron
framework. Chevron instructs courts to defer to administrative agencies’
reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms, at least as long as the
agency’s interpretation appears in a rule or order that carries “the force of
law.”1 Here, the IRS had interpreted the relevant portions of Obamacare to
allow subsidies nationwide, and it had, on the basis of that interpretation,
promulgated a rule—indisputably with the force of law—that treated all states
the same for subsidy purposes. In a statement accompanying the IRS’s final
rule, the agency argued that its interpretation was “consistent with the
language, purpose, and structure of section 36B and the Affordable Care Act as
a whole.”2
According to straightforward understandings of Chevron, the IRS’s
interpretation obviously should have triggered the Chevron framework.
Chevron would then have instructed the Court to ask only two questions to
determine the permissibility of the IRS Rule: (1) Is the statute silent or
ambiguous on the precise question at issue, even after applying all of the
traditional tools of statutory construction to discern statutory meaning? (2) If
yes—if no single meaning is apparent from the statute as ordinarily
construed—is the agency’s interpretation reasonable? If the Court had
concluded that the statute was ambiguous and that the agency’s interpretation
was reasonable, then it could have upheld the IRS Rule without holding that
the agency’s interpretation was the “right” interpretation of the statute.
After such a holding, however, future administrations would have been able
to change course. When a court upholds an agency’s construction under
1

United States v. Mead Corp, 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30377, 30378 (proposed May 23,
2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1 and 602).
2
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Chevron, the holding allows future administrations to reverse or alter the
construction at will, as long as the new construction is also reasonable. Indeed,
in Chevron itself, the interpretation the Court was reviewing was a reversal of
the Environmental Protection Agency’s longstanding construction of a Clean
Air Act provision, and the Court deferred to it anyway. In a later case, Brand
X,3 the Supreme Court made explicit its understanding that agencies may, over
time, alternate among reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms.
THE CHIEF QUESTION
Roberts’s question at the King oral arguments was a request for
confirmation that the usual pattern would apply here. If the Court upheld the
IRS’s interpretation under Chevron, he asked, would a future president and a
future IRS be legally allowed to take subsidies away from Americans living in
non-establishing states? The Solicitor General answered that a reversal in the
interpretation would likely be “unreasonable” under Chevron Step Two, but
that answer ought to have been little comfort to those who prefer the Obama
Administration’s approach. Agencies basically never lose at Chevron Step
Two.
In the aftermath of the oral arguments, the vast majority of commentators,
including most prominently Jeffrey Toobin,4 understood the Chief’s question
as an indication of his interest in using Chevron as a kind of “passive
virtue”5—a way for the unelected Court to avoid deciding a politically
contentious question with finality. A Chevron holding would assign to the
executive branch the power and duty to choose among plausible interpretations
of § 36B.
At least at a superficial level, King seemed like the perfect candidate for that
kind of holding. On a simplistic understanding of the case and the statute, the
issue in King presented a conflict between two policy “goods”: universal
insurance and federalism. The government’s argument was that Obamacare
intended to give everyone in the country access to affordable insurance, which
required nationwide subsidies, but the plaintiffs’ argument was that Obamacare
intended to avoid a complete federal takeover of health insurance regulation,
which required state-based exchanges. And according to the plaintiffs, the
contingency of subsidies on exchange establishment was a necessary piece of
the overall statutory commitment to preserving state power in healthcare
regulation—a crucial incentive for the states to agree to establish and manage
their own exchanges. The debate thus centered on a policy tension within the
statute, and there was no doubt that both sides were, in a superficial sense,
3

Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967
(2005).
4 Jeffrey Toobin, Did John Roberts Tip His Hand?, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 4, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/did-john-roberts-tip-his-hand.
5 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1986).
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right. Obamacare really did try to achieve universal affordable health
insurance, and it really did try to avoid a federal takeover of health insurance
regulation.
When a question of statutory interpretation involves a difficult
accommodation of conflicting policy goals—like the tension between
economic growth and environmental protection at issue in Chevron and the
superficial tension between universal insurance and federalism at issue in
King—the argument for Chevron deference is particularly strong. A Chevron
holding allows the Court to avoid declaring an outcome, leaving the political
balancing act to a political branch: the administrative agencies. In King, a
Chevron holding would have allowed the Obama Administration to prioritize
universal insurance over federalism while allowing a future administration to
instead prioritize federalism over universal insurance.
After the oral arguments, in all of the commentary I read (which was
certainly not all, but probably was most, of the commentary that existed),
everyone interpreted Roberts’s question along these lines. Roberts is generally
a fan of leaving difficult policy choices to the political branches—as he made
clear in his same sex marriage dissent the day after announcing King—and his
question about Chevron seemed to indicate an interest in following the same
strategy for Obamacare. According to the commentary, Roberts appeared
inclined to vote for the government but to do so in a way that would allow
future administrations to shift gears.
The commentary could not have been more wrong.
ROBERTS V. ROBERTS
In his opinion for the Court in King, Roberts argued that the relevant
provision of Obamacare is ambiguous, but he refused to defer to the IRS’s
interpretation under Chevron. Instead, he invoked the “major questions
exception”—an infinitely flexible doctrinal escape-hatch for Chevron cases—
holding that the Chevron framework is inapplicable when the question at issue
is one of “deep ‘economic and political significance.’”6 Rather than letting the
agency decide such a major question, Roberts held that it is “our task”—the
Court’s—”to determine the correct reading of Section 36B.”7
What a strange contrast to the Chief Justice Roberts who argued, so
emphatically and only a day later, that it is not the Court’s task to determine
the scope of the constitutional interest in marital privacy!8 Both King and
Obergefell presented delicate and contentious political issues, and in both
cases, the Court had available to it valid doctrinal bases for deferring to the
political branches. In King, the Court could have used Chevron to defer to the
6

King v. Burwell, No. 14-114, slip op. at 8 (U.S. June 25, 2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)).
7 Id.
8 Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, slip op. at 1-29 (U.S. June 26, 2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).

2015]

KING, CHEVRON, AND THE AGE OF TEXTUALISM

5

IRS, and in Obergefell, the Court could have used rational basis review or
intermediate scrutiny to defer to the states, distinguishing Loving v. Virginia9
on the ground that the earlier case involved the suspect classification of race
while the latter case involved, at most, an intermediate classification of gender.
(Sexual orientation is still, even after Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in
Obergefell, not a suspect classification). But Roberts summarily cast aside the
deferential approach in King even while arguing forcefully for deference in
Obergefell.10
What explains the difference? Consider one simple explanation: It’s easier
to amend a statute than it is to amend the Constitution. If the Court interprets
Obamacare in a way that is politically unpopular, Congress can fix it by
passing a statutory amendment through the ordinary lawmaking process. If the
Court interprets the constitutional right to marital privacy in a way that is
politically unpopular, the political branches can fix it only by passing a
constitutional amendment, which requires a supermajority vote in Congress or
the state legislatures. The need for deference is therefore stronger in a
constitutional case than in a statutory case.
But if that’s the reason for the distinction, then why have Chevron at all?
That logic would justify wholesale abandonment of Chevron; it does not justify
retail exceptions. And Roberts is not inclined to attack Chevron as a general
matter. There was something peculiar about King that made him sideline
deference in that case only.
CHEVRON V. TEXTUALISM
Now consider a more nuanced and complicated explanation: In both cases,
Roberts wanted courts to enforce the political branches’ policy choices. In
Obergefell, enforcement of the states’ political choices required rejection of the
constitutional claim and application of deferential “rational basis” review. But
in King, the political choice that Roberts wanted to enforce was not the IRS’s
or any agency’s; it was the 2010 Congress’s. Despite the sloppily drafted
statutory text, Roberts thought it clear that the 2010 Congress—the Congress
that enacted Obamacare—wanted subsidies to be available nationwide. He
thought it clear that the 2010 Congress, while concerned about federalism,
never intended to use subsidies as an incentive for states to establish their own
exchanges. A threat of withholding subsidies—which was tantamount to a
threat of purposefully destroying insurance markets in non-establishing
states—was too extreme, and there was no evidence beyond the sloppy text
that Congress actually intended to convey such a threat.
Enforcement of Congress’s political choice—enforcement of the enacting
Congress’s intended balance between universal insurance and federalism—
9

388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Obergefell, slip op. at 2 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[A] State’s decision to maintain
the meaning of marriage that has persisted in every culture throughout human history can
hardly be called irrational.”).
10
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required the Court to bind not only the Obama Administration but also all
future administrations to the uniform availability of subsidies. Under the
principle of legislative supremacy, clear congressional choices always trump
agencies’ choices, even when Congress has delegated some interpretive power
to the executive. In order to enforce legislative supremacy and to defer to
Congress’s choice, Roberts needed to hold that the statute not only permits but
requires the IRS to make subsidies available nationwide. Given the entirety of
his opinion, that seems quite clearly to have been Roberts’s conclusion.
But why sideline Chevron to get there? Under Chevron Step One, the Court
must use all “traditional tools of statutory construction” to determine whether
“Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue,” and if the Court
finds a clear congressional intent, then “that intention is the law and must be
given effect.”11 If Roberts thought it obvious that Congress intended to make
subsidies available nationwide, why did he not simply hold under Chevron
Step One that Congress’s intent was clear and that the IRS’s construction was
the only correct interpretation of the statute? Why did he argue, instead, that
Section 36B is ambiguous but that this and future agencies deserve no
deference under Chevron?
The problem is that Roberts lives in the age of textualism. Section 36B
contained language—”established by the State”—that the government’s
interpretation rendered superfluous. The government gave no explanation for
the presence of that language other than a “term of art” argument that I found
unconvincing, despite agreeing with the government’s conclusion, and Roberts
apparently found it unconvincing, too. He made no reference to the “term of
art” view and admitted that his construction rendered the words “by the State”
superfluous. Upon that admission, however, Roberts needed to justify his
decision to read three words out of the statute. His justification was that
enforcement of the text would undermine the purpose—though Roberts, in his
age of textualism, carefully used the term “legislative plan” rather than
“legislative purpose” in making that argument.
So where’s the Chevron problem? Surely legislative purpose is a “traditional
tool of statutory construction” that should be permissible at Chevron Step One.
Apparently not, according to Roberts. In the age of textualism, Roberts argued,
broad notions of legislative purpose—particularly if the purpose is most clearly
evident from sources extrinsic to the text of the relevant provision—are
admissible evidence of congressional intent only if the statutory text is
ambiguous. But in the simultaneous age of Chevron, ambiguous statutory text
constitutes a delegation of interpretive power to the agency, not to the courts.
For a smart and pragmatic textualist in the age of Chevron, King highlights an
annoying “gotcha.”
In King, the answer to the statutory question is perfectly obvious if you’re
willing to take off the textualist’s blinders to legislative purpose. But if you’re
a modern textualist judge, the only permissible way to take off your blinders is
11
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to argue first that the statutory text is ambiguous. But if you argue that the
statutory text is ambiguous, then you have to defer to the agency. But if you
defer to the agency, then future administrations will be allowed to implement
an interpretation of the statute that you know, despite your blinders, is actually
inconsistent with congressional intent—as Roberts went out of his way to
confirm at oral arguments. But if you allow future administrations to violate an
extrinsically obvious but textually ambiguous legislative intent, you will have
violated your obligation to enforce legislative supremacy. But, but, but. . . How
to escape?
For Roberts, the answer was the major questions exception to Chevron
deference. As noted above, the major questions exception is infinitely flexible.
The Court has never articulated a standard for distinguishing “major” from
“minor” questions other than its oblique reference to “economic and political
significance.” And pretty much anything Congress legislates could satisfy a
standard of “economic and political significance.” If a question were not
economically and politically significant, Congress would not have spent its
time passing a statute about it. The standard is—or could easily become—
tautological.
The major questions exception reminds me of the opening scene in Disney’s
Aladdin, in which a street merchant is trying to sell a device of unknown
usefulness: “Combination hookah and coffee maker!” he announces. “Also
makes julienned fries!” Then he bangs the device on the table, proclaiming, “It
will not break! It will not [sproing.] It broke.”12
With enough applications, the major questions exception could subsume
Chevron. Roberts needed an escape hatch from his Chevron-textualism bind,
and he used the most readily apparent and flexible one available—the one that
also makes julienned fries! In so doing, however, he banged the major
questions exception on the table, adding to the list of “major questions”
invocations in a way that could ultimately undermine his own and Chevron’s
commitment to judicial deference.
AN ESCAPE FROM THE ESCAPE
I have a modest suggestion. When the correct answer to a statutory question
is obvious to everyone who’s willing to be honest about congressional intent—
but the obvious answer cannot be proved by applying the “acceptable” tools of
statutory construction (however the “acceptable” toolbox is delimited in a
given era)—judges should simply assert the obvious answer regardless. And
they should do so openly and notoriously at Chevron Step One, without pulling
Houdini-like escapes from the legalistic straight-jackets of their interpretive
philosophies.
Textualism has made tremendous headway in the last several decades, and
not without good cause. When the answer to a statutory question is genuinely
12 ALADDIN
(Walt
Disney
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cd7aik82JyA.
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not obvious, judges promote predictability and transparency—also known as
“the rule of law”—by limiting their inquiry, as much as possible, to the text of
the statute. Chevron has similarly served as a powerful and sensible restraint
on courts. Judges serve rule of law and separation of powers values by
deferring to reasonable administrative interpretations of ambiguous statutory
terms.
But judges do not serve any legitimate values by ignoring obviously correct
resolutions of statutory cases simply because the text of the statute is inartfully
drafted, and judges undermine important rule of law values by refusing
deference to agencies for no reason other than their desire to reach beyond the
“acceptable” toolbox of statutory construction and their sense that they cannot
do so under Chevron Step One.
In King, there was an ever-growing mountain of evidence—all extrinsic to
the statutory text and structure—that the 2010 Congress intended to make
subsidies available nationwide,13 that the plaintiffs in the case were relatively
uninterested in the case’s outcome,14 and that the lawyers and think tanks
funding the lawsuit were primarily interested in destroying rather than
enforcing the statutory scheme.15 There was no extrinsic evidence on the other
side. The only evidence for the plaintiffs’ view was the text. The plaintiffs’
lawyers invented a plausible fairy tale to explain their interpretation—an
extended daydream of some nonexistent but sensible Congress that intended to
use subsidies as an incentive for states to establish exchanges—but the story
was transparently fictional. Everyone knew that the real 2010 Congress had no
such intent.
The first expositors of the plaintiffs’ statutory argument, Jon Adler and
Michael Cannon, pointed to one statement of Senator Ben Nelson’s that might
have supported their fairy tale version of congressional intent,16 but in all of
my conversations with them in academic debates and on Twitter, Adler and
Cannon fiercely denied that they were pointing to Nelson’s statement as
evidence of actual intent. To their mind, textualism demanded an intent-free,
13
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Writers Say, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2015, at A1.
14 Louise Radnofsky, Jess Bravin, & Brent Kendall, Health-Law Challenger’s Standing
in Supreme Court Case Is Questioned, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2015, 6:52 PM),
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15 Jeffrey
Toobin, Hard Cases, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 9, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/03/09/hard-cases-jeffrey-toobin.
16 Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon, Taxation Without Representation: The
Illegal IRS Rule to Expand Tax Credits Under the PPACA, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 119, 149
n.109 (2013).
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robotic interpretation of the statutory text, and actual congressional intent
mattered not at all. But that’s crazy. “Words no longer have meaning”17 if not
understood as representations of their speaker’s intent.
Textualism’s rejection of intent is—and should always be—a rejection of
flimsy extrinsic evidence, cherry-picked empirical arguments, and conclusory
judicial assertions of actual intent. It is not—and should not ever become—an
instruction to judges to adopt any plausible story of congressional intent that
fits the text, even if all of the extrinsic evidence in the world indicates that the
asserted story of congressional intent is empirically wrong. King became a
close case—and Chevron became a weaker doctrine—because the textualist
rejection of flimsy extrinsic evidence of intent expanded dangerously into the
territory of abandoning intent itself.
Roberts’s opinion is a resounding victory for Obamacare; it is a modest
victory for smart structural interpretation in the age of textualism; it is a timid
victory for pragmatic and economic realism. But it is not an unambiguous
triumph of rationality over legalism.
Roberts closed his opinion with this observation: “Congress passed the
Affordable Care Act to improve health insurance markets, not to destroy
them.”18 As everyone including Adler and Cannon and Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito recognized, the plaintiffs’ interpretation would have threatened to destroy
health insurance markets in 34 states while the IRS’s interpretation sought to
improve them. That should have been good enough for Chevron Step One.
Obvious congressional intent should be the law whether obvious from the
text or not. Otherwise, the law becomes “pure applesauce.”19 (Whatever that
means).

17
18
19

King v. Burwell, No. 14-114, slip op. at 2 (U.S. June 25, 2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
King, slip op. at 21 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
King, slip op. at 10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

